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ERIE’S INTERNATIONAL EFFECT: A REPLY 
Donald Earl Childress III* 
INTRODUCTION 
If recent trends continue, it is likely that U.S. federal district courts 
sitting in diversity or alienage will confront transnational choice of law 
issues1 in a significant number of cases in the years to come.2 Currently, 
when resolving these issues, federal district courts unflinchingly follow 
state choice of law rules to determine the governing substantive law (U.S. 
state or foreign).3 Federal courts believe they are compelled by the Erie 
doctrine to follow state choice of law rules even in transnational cases 
because, according to the Supreme Court in a decision from the 1970s that 
predates the substantial expansion of transnational litigation, a “federal 
court in a diversity case is not free to engraft onto those state rules 
exceptions or modifications which may commend themselves to the federal 
court, but which have not commended themselves to the State in which the 
federal court sits.”4 Even when the foreign affairs or public policy interests 
of the United States might be implicated in the case, and even when those 
interests might be significantly different from the forum state’s interests, 
federal courts apply state choice of law rules. Put simply, transnational 
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1
  As used here, transnational choice of law refers to a case where a federal court is asked to choose 
between applying U.S. law (e.g., the law of Virginia) or foreign, non-U.S. law (e.g., the law of France). 
See SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION: PAST, PRESENT AND 
FUTURE 3–4 (2006) (defining international (state) conflicts as conflicts between the laws of the several 
states and the laws of foreign countries). Transnational choice of law issues would tend to arise in cases 
involving a foreign plaintiff, a foreign defendant, acts or omissions occurring in a foreign country, or 
some combination of these elements. 
2
  See Marcus S. Quintanilla & Christopher A. Whytock, The New Multipolarity in Transnational 
Litigation: Foreign Courts, Foreign Judgments, and Foreign Law, 18 SW. J. INT’L LAW 31, 37 (2011) 
(“Our third conjecture is that in 2021, U.S. judges and lawyers will encounter issues involving the law of 
foreign countries more often than ever.”). There is also reason to believe that state courts will confront 
similar issues. See, e.g., Donald Earl Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next 
Wave of Transnational Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709 (2012); Christopher A. Whytock, Donald Earl 
Childress III, & Michael D. Ramsey, Foreword: After Kiobel—International Human Rights Litigation in 
State Courts and Under State Law, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1 (2013). 
3
  See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (holding that under the Erie 
doctrine, a federal court must apply state choice of law rules). 
4
  Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4 (1975) (per curiam). 
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choice of law in diversity and alienage cases before federal district courts is 
U.S. state law. 
In When Erie Goes International5 (the Article), I endeavored to open 
up a conversation concerning the Erie doctrine’s applicability in 
transnational cases. While potential points for discussion were many, I 
explored the concrete questions raised by the application of the Erie 
doctrine to transnational choice of law. I began by evaluating whether the 
Constitution, the Rules of Decision Act, and the Rules Enabling Act, which 
may counsel in favor of the application of the choice of law rules of the 
several states in domestic cases, similarly require the application of state 
choice of law rules in transnational cases. They do not.6 
Given that the Erie doctrine is animated by the “twin aims” of 
discouraging forum shopping between state and federal courts and avoiding 
the inequitable administration of the laws,7 I next evaluated whether those 
aims were met by applying state choice of law rules in transnational cases. 
At least in some cases, they were not.8 Among other things, I illustrated that 
a doctrine designed to create parity between federal and state courts when 
interpreting state law in domestic cases has morphed into a doctrine that 
also elevates parity between federal and state courts in the same state when 
applying state or foreign law in transnational cases.9 As the Article 
explored, this should not necessarily be the case in light of the modern 
experience with transnational litigation, where, in many cases, federal 
interests and foreign affairs are implicated. 
Even more troubling for our federal system, this parity requirement 
creates the opportunity for forum shopping between the several states for 
the most favorable state choice of law rule to govern a transnational case. 
For instance, if a French plaintiff is injured in France by a U.S. corporation 
subject to general jurisdiction in California and Virginia, the French 
plaintiff will compare those states’ choice of law rules to determine where 
the case should be filed. If the plaintiff desires French law, she might favor 
filing in Virginia, given that Virginia’s choice of law rules select the law 
where the injury occurred.10 If, however, California law is more favorable to 
the plaintiff’s claim, she might favor filing in California, where choice of 




  Donald Earl Childress III, When Erie Goes International, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1531 (2011). 
6
  See id. at 1555–66. 
7
  See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467–68 (1965). 
8
  See Childress, supra note 5, at 1570–73. 
9
  See id. 
10
  See, e.g., Hodson v. A. H. Robins Co., 528 F. Supp. 809, 823 (E.D. Va. 1981) (finding “that the 
Virginia rule in personal injury actions is . . . the law of the place of the injury”). 
11
  See, e.g., Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 546 P.2d 719, 721 (Cal. 1976) (illustrating California’s 
comparative impairment approach). 
108:1 (2013) Erie’s International Effect: A Reply  
 3 
As this example shows, there is also the risk of inequitable 
administration of the laws in transnational cases. These cases will be treated 
differently by the varying choice of law rules of the several states 
depending on where they are filed. More so, there is the risk that important 
federal interests will not be given effect in transnational cases because state 
choice of law rules are seen as the only rules that matter. 
A brief example that is currently bedeviling courts shows the present 
salience of the question: Should it be the case that the choice of law rules of 
New York determine whether heirs of Holocaust victims, whose art was 
allegedly stolen by the Nazis, may state a claim for relief in federal court, 
when it is the United States that has undertaken international law 
obligations to repatriate this property?12 In short, applying the Erie doctrine 
in transnational cases without a critical lens perhaps leads to results adverse 
to U.S. public policy. 
In light of Erie’s twin aims, I put forward a suggested approach to 
encourage courts to more forthrightly engage in analyzing transnational 
conflicts cases.13 In brief, the approach was as follows. First, a federal court 
should determine whether a conflict between U.S. and foreign law exists.14 
If there is not a conflict, the court may apply forum law, assuming that law 
has at least some constitutionally sufficient connection to the case. Second, 
if there is a conflict, the federal court should evaluate critically whether the 
application of a state’s choice of law rules support federal objectives.15 In 
other words, it should not unflinchingly apply state choice of law rules in 
transnational cases. Should those rules, however, support federal objectives, 
it is well established that federal district courts may apply state law, not 
because of compulsion under Erie and Klaxon but because it does not 
thwart federal objectives.16 As such, a federal court may choose to follow 
state conflict of laws rules directing it to apply foreign law or some other 
law. 
Third, if the court concludes that federal interests are not effectuated 
by state choice of law rules, it must endeavor to locate a jurisdiction that 
 
12
  See, e.g., Bakalar v. Vavra, 500 F. App’x 6 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, No. 12-1160, 2013 WL 
1193864 (U.S. Apr. 29, 2013). 
13
  See Childress, supra note 5, at 1573–79. 
14
  In many circumstances, even this initial inquiry is short circuited on account of the increasing 
willingness of courts to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds. Id. at 1572. 
15
  Cf. Ungaro–Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227, 1232–33 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that 
the Erie doctrine does not apply to litigation that implicates the nation’s foreign relations; federal 
common law applies in those cases). 
16
  See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991) (“[F]ederal courts should 
‘incorporat[e] [state law] as the federal rule of decision,’ unless ‘application of [the particular] state law 
[in question] would frustrate specific objectives of the federal programs.’”) (alterations in original) 
(quoting United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979)); see also Semtek Int’l Inc. v. 
Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 509 (2001) (“This federal reference to state law will not obtain, 
of course, in situations in which the state law is incompatible with federal interests.”). 
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has the requisite constitutional contacts with the case such that the 
application of that law would effectuate federal interests. A court would not 
be left to totally write on a clean slate, as most federal courts recognize 
generally that for purposes of federal conflicts law the Second Restatement 
is controlling.17 Furthermore, courts could look to the development of the 
law in the several states.18 
In exploring Erie’s transnational effects in the choice of law context, I 
had several hopes. First, I hoped to encourage a more sophisticated 
understanding of the unique dynamics that transnational litigation presents 
for domestic courts. I wanted to test whether importing whole-cloth 
domestic doctrines like the Erie doctrine to adjudicate transnational cases 
makes sense. In some cases, it might; in others, it might not. In either event, 
we need to examine critically whether a doctrine’s application serves its 
stated goals. It is questionable whether the Erie doctrine does that in 
transnational choice of law cases. 
Second, I hoped to explain that transnational and domestic cases might 
be different and could be treated differently by courts. Third, I wanted to 
test empirically the impact that the Erie doctrine might have on other 
doctrines. Surprisingly, I discovered that it might have an impact on the 
forum non conveniens doctrine.19 Fourth, I hoped that bringing the unique 
issues presented by transnational litigation in the Erie context to light would 
encourage further scholarly study, leading to better outcomes in 
transnational choice of law cases. 
In light of these goals, I was pleased to see that one of the leading 
scholars of the Erie doctrine, Professor Michael Steven Green, paid me the 
high honor of engaging the Article.20 In his response, Professor Green 
makes three points. First, he seeks to clarify that most of the Erie doctrine 
still applies in the international context.21 Second, he critiques my 
arguments for abandoning the Erie doctrine in transnational choice of law 
 
17
  See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 19 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (refusing 
to apply the logic of Klaxon to the choice of law question because of the international complexion of the 
case and instead looking to Ninth Circuit case law as well as the Second Restatement to craft a federal 
common law rule); see also, e.g., Alvarez–Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 611 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(illustrating that the court looked to the Second Restatement to determine choice of law rules), rev’d on 
other grounds sub nom. Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
18
  See, e.g., Hisrich v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., Inc. 226 F.3d 445, 449 n.3 (6th Cir. 2000) (illustrating 
the relevance of “restatements of law . . . and the majority rule among other states” in resolving 
underdeveloped questions of law). 
19
  See Childress, supra note 5, at 1560–65. 
20
  See Michael Steven Green, Erie’s International Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 165 
(2013), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2012/17/LRColl2012n17Green.pdf. 
21
  See id. at 165–70. 
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cases.22 Third, he argues that, even if my arguments succeed, the impact my 
approach will have on many transnational cases is limited.23 
Professor Green has given me much to think about, and I thank him for 
that. In this Reply, I will follow his thoughtful lead and make one point of 
clarification before exploring more critical points. My clarificatory point 
(Part I) is that the Article was indeed limited to transnational choice of law 
and developing federal procedural common law rules for transnational 
choice of law cases. However, even with that limitation, it has relevance to 
other transnational areas impacted by the Erie doctrine. In short, while 
Professor Green appears to focus on the fact that much of the Erie doctrine 
remains applicable in many transnational cases, the fact that transnational 
choice of law determinations will be on the rise in years to come counsels 
in favor of a qualitative reevaluation of the Erie doctrine in those cases. As 
I explain below, my critical point (Part II) is that the Erie doctrine, as 
applied in transnational choice of law, may have effects on transnational 
forum shopping. I conclude in Part III by illustrating briefly where 
continuing the conversation on Erie’s international effects might take us. 
I. ERIE AND TRANSNATIONAL CHOICE OF LAW 
Let me begin with where we agree. As Professor Green recognizes, the 
point of the Article was not to suggest that federal district courts sitting in 
diversity or alienage adjudicating transnational cases have the ability to 
craft a federal common law rule to govern the substance of the dispute.24 
Federal district courts are not free, absent congressional authorization, to 
make substantive law to govern transnational cases when sitting in diversity 
or alienage, just as they are not free to create such rules in domestic cases. 
Rather, my argument was that in certain circumstances where a federal 
interest is manifest, federal district courts might displace a state choice of 
law rule with a federal choice of law rule that would support federal 
interests. In other words, a federal district court may develop federal 
procedural common law to vindicate federal interests. As such, the federal 
court, through its own choice of law rule, might choose to apply different 
substantive law—be it U.S. state or foreign—in a transnational case, than 
would a state court in the forum where it sits. 
In making this clarification, I appreciate that Professor Green 
highlights one question that looms behind my observation that the twin 
aims of Erie might encourage the development of a federal procedural 
common law rule in transnational choice of law cases—namely, whether 
this federal procedural common law is preemptive federal law that must be 
 
22
  See id. at 170–75. 
23
  See id. at 175–79. 
24
  See id. at 166–69. 
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applied not only in federal court but also in state court.25 As I explained in 
the Article, transnational choice of law rules could be developed as federal 
common law that is either preemptive federal law or nonpreemptive federal 
procedural common law. In my view, courts should adopt the latter 
approach and develop federal procedural common law, which is not treated 
as preemptive federal law.26 In taking this more limited approach, the 
opportunity for further refinement, perhaps even by Congress, is left open.27 
Let me briefly note one disagreement with this clarificatory point that 
will be discussed in more detail below. In Professor Green’s view, “[e]ven 
if the arguments in Childress’s article succeed, their effect is relatively 
narrow.”28 To begin with, this is an empirical question. Professor Green’s 
response provides no empirical evidence that the impact will indeed be 
narrow. In fact, his response does not discuss any actual cases where the 
impact of the doctrine might be applicable. In short, if his is a quantitative 
point, I think we need to have a firmer grasp of the universe of cases before 
we can proclaim such narrow applicability. Even assuming the impact is 
narrow, however, I think there is something to be gained by questioning the 
application of a domestic doctrine from the last century to the fast-moving 
transnational world of litigation today. In short, narrowness might point the 
way to significant problems created by the unflinching application of 
domestic doctrines to transnational cases. 
II. ERIE’S IMPACT ON TRANSNATIONAL CHOICE OF LAW 
In this Part, I examine more closely the impact that the Erie doctrine 
has in transnational choice of law cases. First, I explore how the doctrine 
encourages horizontal forum shopping. Second, I examine the doctrine’s 
impact on forum non conveniens and the enforcement of foreign judgments. 
Both of these sections illustrate why continued reevaluation of the Erie 
doctrine’s applicability in transnational cases is timely and appropriate. 
A. Horizontal Forum Shopping 
Professor Green criticizes my argument that horizontal forum shopping 
supports reevaluating Erie’s application to transnational choice of law. He 
argues that my analysis is too comprehensive (because my arguments apply 
beyond transnational cases) and yet also too narrow (because I do not go as 
far as federalizing choice of law in state courts).29 As to comprehensiveness, 
 
25
  See id. at 170. 
26
  See Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813, 818 (2008) (noting that 
“procedural common law differs from substantive common law only in that it . . . does not bind state 
courts”). 
27
  The disuniformity and inequity created by refusing to completely federalize choice of law in 
transnational cases will be discussed, with other matters, in Part II. 
28
  Green, supra note 20, at 165. 
29
  Id. at 172. 
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he notes that if Klaxon is undermined by transnational forum shopping, so 
too is it undermined by domestic forum shopping. According to him, I 
“offer[] no evidence that horizontal forum shopping is more of a problem 
when the choice is between the laws of a state and a foreign nation than 
when it is between the laws of two states.”30 
But horizontal forum shopping is a greater concern in transnational 
cases. In the early 1980s, Lord Denning, perhaps the most celebrated 
English judge of the twentieth century,31 famously opined: “As a moth is 
drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United States. If he can only 
get his case into their courts, he stands to win a fortune.”32 There are several 
reasons for this. First, U.S. substantive law is thought to be more favorable 
to plaintiffs than the laws of other countries. Second, U.S. procedural law—
in particular, notice pleading, liberal discovery, and aggregate litigation—
gives plaintiffs substantial leverage in pleading, proving, trying, and settling 
their cases. Third, U.S. damages law—especially punitive damages and jury 
awards—presents the potential for a windfall for plaintiffs, or, at a 
minimum, significant ability to force defendants to settle.33 While we are in 
the midst of change to the substantive and procedural laws of foreign fora, 
in part brought about by a restrictive U.S. approach to transnational 
litigation, the general belief is that a foreign plaintiff would be expected to 
choose a U.S. forum to bring suit, if possible as a matter of jurisdiction, in 
order to take advantage of more favorable U.S. law. This is so even in cases 
where the harms complained of occurred abroad and in cases where the 
evidence is located abroad. 
Of course, these reasons illustrate why a plaintiff would choose to 
bring suit in the United States generally. A plaintiff would want to bring a 
transnational case in the United States specifically because they can forum 
shop amongst the several states for the most favorable substantive law. The 
Erie doctrine makes this forum shopping possible in federal court as well 
by requiring federal courts to apply the choice of law rules of the state in 
which they sit, even when application of those rules might not effectuate 
federal interests or public policy. As Professor Green’s hypothetical 
illustrates, a California plaintiff injured in Germany by a product made by a 
California company subject to general jurisdiction in California and 
Virginia, who would prefer to have German law apply, would consider 
 
30
  Id. at 171. 
31
  J. Skelly Wright, Law and the Logic of Experience: Reflections on Denning, Devlin, and Judicial 
Innovation in the British Context, 33 STAN. L. REV. 179, 180 (1980). 
32
  Smith Kline & French Labs. Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730 (A.C.) at 733 (Eng.). 
33
  See Roger P. Alford, Arbitrating Human Rights, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 508–09, 516 
(2008). 
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forum shopping to Virginia, as it follows the First Restatement and would 
be expected to apply the law of the state of injury.34 
Compare this to purely domestic cases. While there are procedural 
differences between the several states, they are not as great as those 
encountered between U.S. and foreign jurisdictions. For instance, most 
states provide for class actions, while aggregate litigation is limited abroad. 
Similarly, most states provide for liberal discovery, which is also limited 
abroad. Likewise, there is a greater likelihood of similarity between the 
substantive laws of various U.S. jurisdictions, as opposed to the laws 
between a common law jurisdiction like the United States and the rest of the 
world, which is predominantly based on civil law. The greater similarity in 
procedural and substantive law between the several states prevents many of 
these forum shopping incentives from having the same impact in domestic 
cases. 
Above and beyond all of these concerns, perhaps the most compelling 
reason that transnational forum shopping is a concern is that it risks 
entangling courts with foreign sovereigns and enmeshing courts in foreign 
affairs. Foreign sovereigns have objected frequently to U.S. courts hearing 
transnational cases. Many transnational cases also present issues perhaps 
more appropriately within the competence of the Executive or Congress. 
These issues do not exist with the same force in domestic forum shopping 
cases. 
Confirming the importance of the transnational forum shopping 
problem, a scholarly literature is developing that illustrates a transnational 
forum shopping market to enforce foreign judgments in the United States.35 
This transnational market is developing precisely because state recognition 
and enforcement rules differ,36 and because federal district courts sitting in 
diversity or alienage believe that the Erie doctrine requires the application 
of state recognition and enforcement rules.37 As a result, judgment creditors 
take advantage of disparate enforcement regimes in the several states to 
forum shop for a state where enforcement will be most easily granted. Once 
granted, the foreign judgment is treated as a domestic judgment and must be 
granted full faith and credit in another U.S. state. With the likelihood of 
 
34
  See Green, supra note 20, at 171. I have had to change Professor Green’s hypothetical slightly to 
account for personal jurisdiction. In his original hypothetical, a California company manufactured a 
product in California that injured a Californian in Germany. Under such facts, the only fora where the 
plaintiff could file suit would be California or Germany. 
35
  See generally Gregory H. Shill, Ending Judgment Arbitrage: Jurisdictional Competition and the 
Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments in the United States, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. (forthcoming 2013) 
(examining the way litigants forum shop for favorable enforcement law). 
36
  See id. 
37
  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 cmt. c (1971) (noting that there is 
“consensus” in state and federal courts that such matters are governed by state law). 
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such enforcement actions increasing before U.S. courts,38 so too is the 
potential for increased forum shopping in transnational cases. 
In short, the risk of horizontal forum shopping is greater in 
transnational cases. As these cases continue to make their way into U.S. 
courts, the ill effects of the present approach to transnational choice of law 
will become more manifest. In light of the fact that transnational cases risk 
bringing the United States in conflict with foreign sovereigns, there is every 
reason to support reexamining the Erie doctrine’s application in 
transnational choice of law cases. 
As to Professor Green’s narrowness point, he is correct that I do not 
believe transnational choice of law should “be federalized in state court.”39 
Of course, this belief creates tension because the potential unity encouraged 
by federalizing some choice of law in transnational cases filed in federal 
courts might be short circuited by forum shopping between state courts. In 
other words, what good is it if plaintiffs can escape federal procedural 
choice of law by filing in state courts to avail themselves of favorable 
choice of law rules? 
Two responses: First, many transnational cases will be subject to 
removal and thus limit the possibility of state-to-state forum shopping that 
is risked by not federalizing state choice of law. To be sure, there is some 
risk that reverse forum shopping by defendants might be equally 
problematic. However, by providing a federal forum that takes account of 
federal interests, there is the possibility that the playing field might be 
leveled. Second, the fact that federal courts would be permitted, in my 
approach, to develop federal choice of law will place state choice of law in 
sharp relief. To the extent a federal district court creates a federal choice of 
law rule in an instant case, such a rule will signal to other courts and 
policymakers that legal reform might be necessary. For instance, Congress 
might step in to resolve some of the issues created by disuniform federal 
and state rules, as was done in the case of the Class Action Fairness Act.40 
As such, and to the extent there is disuniformity, Congress might be moved 
to take legislative action to account for this type of horizontal forum 
shopping. 
B. Forum Non Conveniens 
Continuing his theme that my approach is both too comprehensive and 
too narrow, and after agreeing with the Article (although not its proposals) 
that requiring the application of state choice of law rules in transnational 
 
38
  See Quintanilla & Whytock, supra note 2, at 39 (stating that U.S courts are encountering foreign 
law issues with greater frequency). 
39
  Green, supra note 20, at 172. 
40
  28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–15 (2006); see Childress, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, 
and the Next Wave of Transnational Litigation, supra note 2, at 755–57. 
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cases is about the twin aims of Erie and not the Rules of Decision Act,41 
Professor Green turns to my argument that federal courts are increasingly 
using forum non conveniens to short circuit choice of law analysis in 
transnational cases. In examining how forum non conveniens and the Erie 
doctrine overlap, my point was to show that legal doctrine has litigation 
effects that should be explored empirically. Professor Green argues that at 
best this observation would support “a federal common law rule that limits 
a court’s ability to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds simply 
because foreign law applies,”42 and does not support the creation of federal 
choice of law rules in transnational cases. Before getting to the substance of 
his critique, let us look at some updated numbers that paint a more complete 
picture from the numbers developed in the original Article. 
As I noted in the Article, there has been a significant increase in forum 
non conveniens decisions in federal courts in recent years. Between 1990 
and 2006, there were roughly 691 (about 43 per year) reported transnational 
forum non conveniens decisions by federal courts.43 Overall, the courts 
dismissed in favor of a foreign forum in about 50% of these cases.44 In cases 
involving a foreign plaintiff, the dismissal rate was higher, at 63.4%.45 
Moreover, foreign plaintiffs are “twice as likely to have their suits 
dismissed” compared to domestic plaintiffs.46 
In light of these numbers, the Article took a snapshot of cases filed pre- 
and post-Sinochem,47 up to April 1, 2011. Sinochem is not only the Court’s 
most recent forum non conveniens decision, but also might encourage 
 
41
  I am unclear as to Professor Green’s ultimate conclusion on the Rules Enabling Act’s 
applicability. At one point, he seems to say that it applies, and then, in a footnote, he reserves judgment. 
See Green, supra note 20, at 169 & n.38. He argues that I give “no reason to think that the Rules 
Enabling Act’s substantive right limitation does not apply in an international context.” Id. at 169. But, he 
gives us no reason to think that it does. See id. at n.38. One would think greater specificity should be 
required when applying congressional legislation to foreign issues. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank 
Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010) (reaffirming the presumption against the extraterritorial application 
of acts of Congress). 
42
  Green, supra note 20, at 174. 
43
  Christopher A. Whytock, Politics and the Rule of Law in Transnational Judicial Governance: The 
Case of Forum Non Conveniens 15 (Feb. 28, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=969033. 
44
  Id. at 16. 
45
  Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481, 503 
(2011). This is likely accounted for by the fact that in conducting the forum non conveniens analysis a 
court may give less deference to a foreign plaintiff’s choice of forum under Supreme Court case law. See 
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255–56 (1981) (“When the home forum [is] chosen, it is 
reasonable to assume that this choice is convenient. When the plaintiff is foreign, however, this 
assumption is . . . less reasonable. Because the central purpose of any forum non conveniens inquiry is to 
ensure that the trial is convenient, a foreign plaintiff’s choice deserves less deference.”). Indeed, I note 
that such a demonstrated disparity between domestic and foreign plaintiffs may itself have implications 
for U.S. foreign relations. 
46
  Whytock, supra note 45, at 503–04. 
47
  Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007). 
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greater use of the doctrine, as the Court there held that a forum non 
conveniens dismissal could be entered even before determining the question 
of jurisdiction.48 A search of cases invoking the doctrine after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Sinochem up to January 1, 2012, confirms that motions 
to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens may be on the rise.49 
Since Sinochem, 94 reported cases have raised the issue (about 24 per 
year). Of those, 48% were dismissed.50 Of these dismissals, 82% explicitly 
recognized that a reason for dismissal was the application of foreign law.51 
When foreign plaintiffs are involved, the numbers tell a slightly different 
story. Since Sinochem, 56 of the 94 cases (nearly 60%) involved foreign 
plaintiffs. Of these cases, the dismissal rate was 52%. 
Yet these numbers likely underreport the real impact of the doctrine on 
cases before the federal courts. Since 2007, courts have increasingly dealt 
with these issues through unpublished opinions—while 45% of these cases 
were reported in 2007, only 17% were reported in 2011.52 Indeed, during 
the timeframe of Whytock’s study, the reporting rate was closer to 45%.53 
While the dismissal rate for unpublished decisions hovers around 51%, 
what is striking is that there had been 261 unpublished cases raising forum 
non conveniens since Sinochem. Of these unreported cases, 75% explicitly 
recognized the application of foreign law as a reason for dismissal.54 When 
foreign plaintiffs were involved (in 102 of the 261 cases), the dismissal rate 
jumped to 71%. In sum, approximately 355 cases since Sinochem have 
raised forum non conveniens, with an average of 78.5% recognizing foreign 
law as an important factor in dismissing the case.55 One hundred fifty-eight 
of these cases involved foreign plaintiffs, and on average, 62% were 
dismissed.56 
The data for all of 2012 presents a slightly different picture. In 2012, 
twelve reported cases raised the issue of forum non conveniens. Of those, 
 
48
  Id. at 435. 
49
  In short, the approach was as follows: First, the Westlaw database was searched for all U.S. 
district court cases raising the term forum non conveniens between March 5, 2007, (the date of the 
Sinochem decision) and January 1, 2012. Second, all decisions were then reviewed and cases that were 
not actual decisions by U.S. federal district courts granting or denying a forum non conveniens motion 
in favor of a foreign forum were discarded. Third, these cases were then analyzed to yield the results 
explained in the text above. See Memorandum from Donald Earl Childress III (June 13, 2013) (on file 
with author and Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy).  
50
  Id. 
51
  Id. 
52
  Id. 
53
  This number was reached by comparing the number of published cases to unpublished cases 
during the time of Whytock’s study. This statistic suffers from some incompleteness, as there is no good 
denominator because not all published and unpublished cases are included in the available databases. In 
short, it is complicated to estimate publication rates based on current databases. 
54
  Id. 
55
  Id. 
56
  Id. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N U N I V E R S I T Y L A W R E V I E W C O L L O Q U Y 
 12 
42% were dismissed. Of these dismissals, 60% explicitly recognized that a 
reason for dismissal was the application of foreign law. When foreign 
plaintiffs were involved, the numbers changed. In 2012, seven of twelve 
reported cases (58%) involved foreign plaintiffs. Of these cases, the 
dismissal rate was 57%. 
In 2012, only 20% of cases raising forum non conveniens questions 
were reported, with 80% being unreported. Of the unreported cases, 45% 
were dismissed. Sixty-seven percent of unreported cases explicitly 
recognized the application of foreign law as a reason for dismissal. When 
foreign plaintiffs were involved (36% of cases), the dismissal rate was 71%. 
Courts may thus be using the forum non conveniens doctrine to resist 
applying foreign law and may be pushing such decisions to unreported 
cases. 
As explained in the Article, the fact that the Erie doctrine might be 
creating this system in part is yet another reason to reexamine our 
commitments to its application in transnational cases. As Professor Green 
notes, federalizing choice of law in transnational cases is but one way to 
deal with this issue. But, there may be other ways to deal with this issue. 
These ways will only be considered once we cast aside our uncritical 
commitment to Erie’s absolute application in transnational choice of law. In 
sum, I may be right that limited federalization of choice of law in 
transnational cases helps deal with this issue; Professor Green may be right 
that federalizing and changing the forum non conveniens doctrine may be 
the more appropriate approach. 
As I illustrated in the Article, we cannot get to the proposal stage 
without being willing to question the Erie doctrine’s application in actual 
transnational cases. The fact that Professor Green has offered a 
counterproposal to a proposal put forward in light of a critical evaluation of 
the Erie doctrine’s application in transnational cases illustrates why the 
unflinching application of the Erie doctrine in transnational cases is worth 
questioning, for it might lead to law reform. 
III. WHAT WILL THE FUTURE BRING? 
Professor Green’s final point is that my approach will be applied only 
rarely. Indeed, I argue that federal choice of law rules should be developed 
only in cases where federal interests are frustrated and a federal rule would 
do more than a state rule to further those interests. According to Professor 
Green, my position would work in Sabbatino-like cases, but other situations 
would be “unusual.”57 
Yet, we cannot know what the future will bring. As already alluded to, 
however, transnational litigation, transnational choice of law, and 
 
57
  See Green, supra note 20, at 175–76; see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 
398 (1964). 
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transnational enforcement of judgments are growing industries. Some 
transnational cases will be filed that raise issues primarily of importance 
only to the parties—e.g., a suit between a foreign plaintiff and a U.S. 
defendant for alleged tortious interference with a private contract in a 
foreign country. Other cases will, however, raise important public 
regulatory concerns—e.g., a suit between a foreign plaintiff and a U.S. 
defendant for alleged torts committed in violation of environmental laws, 
where such actions were taken in concert with foreign governments or 
officials. And, of course, the question of enforcement of foreign judgments 
may raise many public and federal interests as well. 
Here is just one example. On April 17, 2013, the Supreme Court 
applied the presumption against extraterritoriality to limit the Alien Tort 
Statute.58 As I have suggested elsewhere, there is every reason to believe 
that foreign plaintiffs will now seek to bring these suits under state and 
foreign law in federal court.59 Federal district courts sitting in diversity and 
alienage will now face significant choice of law questions. “If courts in 
fifty-two jurisdictions are asked to apply state choice of law rules, the 
possible solutions to the choice-of-law conundrum are almost 
immeasurable. With so many inputs, probability analysis reveals literally 
hundreds of available outcomes.”60 In a post-Kiobel world where plaintiffs 
forum shop in pursuit of the most favorable outcome, the divergent choice 
of law approaches must be part of the analysis. And the appropriateness of a 
federal choice of law rule might be necessary and fitting. 
In such cases, which could amount to scores in any given year if past 
numbers are accurate, U.S. federal courts would be asked to call into 
question actions taken by a foreign sovereign within that sovereign’s 
territory. Cases like Sabbatino are not as unusual as they may seem in light 
of the rapidly evolving world of transnational litigation. 
Finally, Professor Green explains that my “reconceptualization of 
international choice of law would be . . . disruptive.”61 Experimentation in 
situations where the status quo presents the potential for inadequacy is 
always disruptive. Disruption has its own benefit: it signals to policymakers 
that legal doctrine is perhaps not working and should be subject to 
investigation not just by courts but by democratically elected branches of 
government. 
In sum, laying bare the policy arguments and implications of the Erie 
doctrine’s application in transnational choice of law cases affords us the 
 
58
  See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
59
  See Donald Earl Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next Wave of 
Transnational Litigation, supra note 2, at 723–28. 
60
  Roger P. Alford, Human Rights after Kiobel: Choice of Law in Transnational Tort Litigation 11 
(June 13, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
61
  Green, supra note 20, at 179. 
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opportunity to pull back the curtain on an area of law that is in need of 
clarity and development. 
CONCLUSION 
Let me return again to a point made earlier. The purpose of When Erie 
Goes International was to open up a conversation concerning the 
applications and implications of the Erie doctrine in transnational cases. In 
short, the question was: Should federal courts continue to unflinchingly 
apply the Erie doctrine in transnational choice of law cases? There are 
many other related questions that could be asked. For instance, when 
choosing foreign law, it is debatable what level of interpretive fidelity must 
be given to the foreign jurisdiction’s determinations as to its law. Indeed, it 
is contestable whether that is the right question to ask at all or whether the 
question is what interpretive fidelity would the state court give to the 
foreign jurisdiction’s determinations.62 According to one recent article, 
“when federal courts apply a state’s choice of law rules, they are not bound 
to follow state courts’ understanding of foreign law that applies under such 
rules.”63 While they are not bound, they may choose to do it nonetheless.64 
In my view, the Erie doctrine muddles the analysis because it forecloses 
forthright engagement with the real question at stake in many transnational 
cases: Which state’s law should be applied? 
Even beyond these questions, other questions that relate to 
transnational choice of law and the Erie doctrine remain. Is the forum non 
conveniens doctrine substantive or procedural for Erie purposes? Should 
the question of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments be 
governed by federal or state law? 
In conclusion, the Article and this wonderful conversation with 
Professor Green emphasize that there are many reasons to support 
reexamining the application of the Erie doctrine in transnational cases. My 
proposal—a first attempt, if you will, at working through these complex 
issues—is not the only way to deal with the issues. If Erie is to “go 
international,” we should carefully examine the reasons for so doing in light 




  See Anglo Am. Ins. Grp. v. CalFed, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 1070, 1077 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
63
  Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, General Law in Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 655, 682 n.109 (2013). 
64
  Compare Anglo Am. Ins. Grp., 899 F. Supp. at 1077 (trying to foretell “what the courts of the 
forum state would predict that the courts of the foreign jurisdiction would find”), with United States v. 
One Lucite Ball Containing Lunar Material, 252 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1380 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (rejecting the 
suggestion that the court “import[] American principles of statutory construction into the analysis” of 
Honduran law). 
